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This paper examines the sadhus’ ways of fashioning the ‘self’ and body, creating ‘a style of 
existence’ by one’s relation to oneself as a model of life-style politics. The sadhu as non-
sovereign subject, constitutes a new power relation in relation to himself, which Foucault calls 
‘self-fashioning’ one’s own existence, marking the radical impossibility of domination and control 
by the coercive institutions of society and state. This paper focuses mainly on questions of life-
style politics as concomitant forms of politics, rendering dominant power relations ineffective in 
ruling over life, as well as how the sadhus’ non-sovereign mode of life ‘becomes resistance to 
power when power takes life as its object’ (Deleuze 1988). 
 
 
 
Michel Foucault, in his later works such as The Care of the Self, was redefining the concept 
of the political not simply as an edifice of power, but as a set of practices that constitute an 
act of ‘self-fashioning’ of one’s existence beyond existing power relations. In affecting 
oneself by oneself, one can create the new within the prevalent forms of power, thereby not 
only creating new forms of power but redefining oneself beyond a given power relation. 
Following Foucault, I first examine traditional understandings of the political as existing 
power relations based on social contract theory, and argue for the political as the ‘art of 
living’, or an ‘ethics of self-fashioning’ of one’s existence by freeing oneself from one’s 
political bond with the given power relations, and creating an alternative bond with one’s 
own community. Second, I examine how the South Asian sadhu tradition can furnish an 
example of nonsovereign politics—an alternative practice of politics that does not pass 
through an existing mainstream social formation. The term ‘nonsovereign’ is first used by 
Foucault in one of his lectures at the College de France, and since then has rarely been used 
in academia. Sovereign is necessarily antithetical to ‘nonsovereign’. By the term sovereign 
or sovereign power, Foucault refers to disciplinary power, a shift that Western culture made 
after the decline of sovereign forms of power around the turn of the Seventeenth Century. 
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But, I am  using the term in a broader sense, which includes power of formation of the 
subject through self-constitution. The nonsovereign is both power (and potentiality) and 
being. With this name, the individual achieves a new status, more powerful revolutionary 
and poetic, than the status of the body1 being trapped in social power (broadly construed 
as any form of power that oppresses individuals).   
I argue that the frameworks of politics as power relations in a given state formation are 
incompatible with the understanding of a sadhu’s politics of life. In sadhus’ lives, power has 
a different connotation. It is understood as energy, spiritual force, and potency of body; 
experiences in life rather than the forms of domination and representation. As Chua 
suggests: ‘Power saturates lived experience, and the ways in which it is felt, enacted and 
articulated require analyses that pay serious attention to the dynamic processes of everyday 
life’2. Such an understanding of power as lived experience ‘extends beyond genealogical, 
historicized approaches to models of power’.3 In other words, power (shakti) constitutes a 
politics of life or self, which is more like the power of the soul, the power of the divine force 
realised in or through the body, and different than the politics of the state. 
If one of the important dimensions of the ‘political’ constitutes forming the ‘self’, forming 
the body4 and creating a ‘style of existence’ by one’s relation to oneself, the question that I 
want to ask is how it opens up a nonsovereign or under-current politics. The question leads 
me to the ancient sadhu tradition, in a similar way that Michel Foucault was led to studying 
ancient Greek and Roman societies, not in search of the content (edifice of judicial 
sovereignty) of an alternative model of the ‘political’, shaping what we are, but in search of 
the way to it – the art of living, care of the self, or self-fashioning one’s own existence. In 
my personal observation of the sadhus at Pashupatinath temple in Kathmandu, Nepal in 
2012, I was fascinated by the way sadhus constituted the ‘political’ for themselves, 
furnishing an example of how human beings self-organize themselves into communities 
capable of self-affectively relating to each other when defining who they are. This resonated 
with Foucault’s own observations, namely 
 
at the opposite extreme one finds the attitude that consists, on the contrary, in defining what 
one is purely in relation to oneself. It is then a matter of forming and recognizing oneself as the 
subject of one’s own actions, not through a system of signs donating power over others, but 
through a relation that depends as little as possible on status and its external forms, for this 
relation is fulfilled in the sovereignty that one exercises over oneself. Sovereignty here does not 
                                                
1 Body here is not only considered as a biological site but a source of political possibilities that one creates by 
rediscovering its power. 
2 Chua & et al, p. 8. 
3 Chua & et al, p. 8. 
4	Chua & et al, p. 8.	
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refer to domination or mastery over others, but one’s capacity to self-govern oneself. To the 
new forms of the political game, and to the difficulty of conceiving oneself as an acting subject 
placed between birth and functions, tasks and rights, prerogatives and subordinations, one was 
able to respond by intensifying all the recognizable marks of status or by seeking an adequate 
relationship with oneself.5 
 
In many ways, the sadhu culture certainly reminds us of the ancient Greeks in that the 
‘political’ is considered as ‘caring of oneself’6. The idea of  the ‘political’ as a capacity to 
self-fashion oneself repoliticises the conventional notion of politics as an edifice of juridical 
sovereignty. What makes the political and its new relation to ourselves is not an edifice of 
power but an ethics of the art of self-fashioning or beoming active transformatively. It moves 
away from a traditional understanding of the political as existing ideological power relations 
to an ‘art of living’ or ‘self-fashioning’ one’s existence by oneself beyond the prevalent forms 
of power relations. Put differently, it maps out its new relation with oneself by moving to a 
self-sovereign model of lifestyle politics in which one constitutes one’s ‘political’ through 
self-fashioning what one is.  
Keeping in view this notion of the political as self-constituting oneself illustrated by 
Foucault in his analysis of ancient Greek life in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, my own 
journey through the ancient Indian world of the sadhus elicits frustration with general 
understandings of the ‘political’ and its relation to our identity, primarily in terms of 
conventional power relations such as ‘sovereign power’, ‘disciplinary power’, and ‘society 
of control’7. This has led me to explore a nonsovereign way of ‘self-fashioning’ one’s own 
‘political’. What interests me in the sadhus is not the salvation that they seek in life but the 
‘aesthetic of their existence’, the way they self-constitute the political/social for themselves, 
constituting themselves as who they are; ‘the precept according to which one must give 
attention to oneself...took the form of attitude, a mode of behaviour; it became instilled in 
ways of living…it thus came to constitute a social[political] practice’8. The sadhus constitute 
their own ‘self’ beyond the ‘dispositif of power’ (dominant power relations) in a very 
aesthetic manner9. If not ‘beyond’, they certainly redo/alter their existing political relation 
with the state and mainstream social formation in a new way. The sadhus’ act of ‘self-
fashioning’ one’s own existence speaks against the idea that the body and self are merely a 
social formation. 
                                                
5 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: III, p. 85. 
6 Taking care of oneself seems to be personal activity; how does it constitute our “political” and shape what 
we are, which in the usual sense demands engagement with others? What relationship does one keep with 
others when one engages to take care of oneself?  Foucault answers “you should take care of the self for others 
who, in the community formed by the city-state, ensured your own salvation.”6 Taking care of oneself 
guarantees your “ataraxy” and happiness, but it comes off with “heavy responsibility.”  
7 Deleuze talks about these three forms of power that move from one to another: from the centralized form of 
power such as the King, to the defused networks of power, to the surveillance State. 
8 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: III, p. 45.   
9	Foucault, Ibid.	
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The acts of self-forming, and self-transforming practice, in its varied forms and 
manifestations, involve the relation with the others. That relation with others constitutes 
oneself as ethical as well as political subject: 'what establishes the relation with oneself and 
with others, and constitutes the human being as an ethical subject'10. Therefore, the freedom 
of the ethical subject, which is at the same time political too, consists in the possibility of 
choosing the kind of self-fashioning one wants. There are different techniques of the self, 
and those techniques have historical specificities of different ways in which individuals 
make themselves into certain kinds of persons and therefore of the historically specific forms 
in which individuals practice ethical freedom while living in a dominant power relation. 
This seems odd to Foucault, as articulated in Discipline and Punishment and History of 
Madness, particularly as he states: 'The idea that power is a system of domination that 
controls everything and leaves no room for freedom cannot be attributed to me’.11 Foucault’s 
techniques or technologies of the self add to Habermas' classification of three kinds of social 
techniques – techniques of production, signification, and domination. In the section that 
follows, I will demonstrate how sadhus practice techniques of self, constitute alternative 
communities within and beyond a given social formation, and self-fashion who they are. 
First, however, a brief introduction to the ancient sadhu culture.  
The sadhus – great renouncers of life – are also known as holy men, begging monks, 
fortune-tellers and mystic wanderers in India and Nepal. The Sanskrit term sādhu refers to 
renouncers who live a life apart from society in order to focus on their own spiritual practice.  
 
 
  Figure 1.
                                                
10 Foucault, Essential works of Michel Foucault, p. 200.  
11 Foucault, Essential works of Michel Foucault, p. 293. 
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The words come from the Sanskrit root sādh, which means ‘reach one's goal’, ‘make 
straight’, ‘gain power over’, or ‘accomplish’. Depending upon their sects, most usually 
decorate their bodies with ash and colours, and write their mandras on the body (see fig. 1). 
They wear malas (garlands) called rudraksha (see fig. 4), and wrap-around turbans of jata 
(see fig. 2). Their bodies index their identity. They are the ‘cultivators of interiority’. They 
are ‘in their pursuit of the “inner light”, the liberation from all earthly bonds and the 
“knowledge” of the absolute, they have chosen the way of asceticism and yoga. This implies 
a systematic “reprogramming” of body and mind by various methods, such as celibacy, 
renunciation, religious discipline, meditation and austerities.’12 The outlandish bodily art 
activities are an act of devotion to their tutelary deity. The sadhus live together in the 
temples, live alone by themselves in small huts or caves, or wander throughout the country 
alone or in small groups. Their dress and ornaments differ according to their sect, but they 
usually wear yellow/orange robes, twist their matted hair in a knot on top of their heads, 
take vows of poverty and celibacy, and depend on the charity of householders for their food. 
Sadhus usually have only the possessions they carry with them: a danda (staff), a kamandalu 
(jar), a chilim (smoke pipe), an alms bowl, chimta (a fire tong), and an extra piece of cloth. 
Sadhus generally employ, to various degrees, ritual symbolism such as nakedness, matted 
hair, and covering themselves with ashes, which symbolize the sadhus’ individual identity 
and formal rejection of normative society.  
We find in the sadhus a unique way of indexing the body as a site of the political; their 
impressive way of cultivating ‘interiority’ or virtues. Though there are various groups such 
as Jains, Sheikhs, Shaivas, Vaisanavs and Buddhists in South Asia, each cultivating the soul 
in unique ways, a comparative study of their various ways of ‘self-fashioning’ would shed 
great insights, though this is beyond the scope of this paper. We might, however, follow 
Gavin Flood, when he suggests that ‘the renouncer is a creative figure in the history of South 
Asia, and the concerns of the ascetic are focused on individual liberation, the cultivation of 
particular virtues and the development of a higher state of consciousness’13. This paper 
contends that the sadhus’ lives furnish the best example of a nonsovereign model of 
constituting oneself in a different social register. Their care of the self and body is in many 
regards extraordinary and novel in relation to other communities. For one, the sadhus are 
often considered the perfection of ascetic ideals in one’s spiritual life. By bringing them into 
discussion, this paper neither seeks to justify nor criticize the ascetic ideal, but rather seeks 
to find a political efficacy in their lives within such an ideal. Moreover, neither theological 
nor ethnographic in nature, the discussion of the political is via an analysis of aesthetics in 
nature. We therefore focus on how sadhus’ ascetic14 spiritual lives reveal to us new aspects 
of being political, of constituting one’s very subjecthood.  
                                                
12 Hartsuiker, p. 16. 
13 Flood, p. 89. 
14 Asceticism is generally considered nihilist or a negative force. But Nietzsche considers the fact that ascetic 
can also be a positive force. Every new force has to negate something else in inventing itself.  
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It must be stated that the sadhu’s life is often viewed in a religious way and its political 
dimension is generally overlooked. Even the sadhu communities themselves view their acts 
of self-fashioning more-or-less as a way of achieving transcendence or salvation. The 
political efficacy of their practices is drawn here through an examination of their ways of 
life. We do this mindful of any unhelpful imposition of modern notions of the subject in the 
sadhus. The analysis is somehow more transcendental than immanent to sadhus’ goals. The 
religious substance of their lives has been characterised in moral terms of ‘finitude, the Fall, 
and evil, a mode of subjection in the form of obedience to a general law that is at the same 
time the will of a personal good’15. The moral codes with which they form their thoughts 
and desires govern their lives, but these codes are constituted from an ‘altered ethics’; from 
‘a different way of constituting oneself as the ethical subject’;16 of one’s spiritual behaviour, 
which also constitutes a different model of the political in their life. The sadhus’ spiritual 
practice of the body is considered as personal but it is very political—the personal as the 
political. The term ‘spiritual’ or ‘spirituality’ is often understood in relation to a certain 
religious practice, and is considered as a very personal affair. But, following Foucault, the 
spiritual also implies the political activity by which one cares for his/her self, namely ‘the 
form of practices which…can transfigure and save the subject’17. The spiritual goal with the 
project of reprogramming body and self, constitutes a political dimension of their 
asceticism.  
The sadhus’ own formation of the self and body is a political model that counters the 
idea of the self and body as a specific ‘reproduction’ of power/state formation. It actually 
reduces the effects, domination and control of power. Life is liberated from the oppressive 
form of social form of power. This very autonomy amounts at its fullest; and ‘is this not a 
privileged moment for seeing the development and formation of the question of the truth of 
the subject’18? The death of the renouncer as a householder and his new birth as a sadhu 
creates a possibility for an ‘ethics of self-fashioning’ that entails the ‘aesthetics of existence’ 
and the positive aspect of ascetic ideals.19 Such an ethics pushes the limits of institutional 
practices of the given power relation, modifies the values it imposes on us, and helps us to 
think and act otherwise. ‘Unbecoming’ the traditional institutional forms of political 
practices is to become other than what is anticipated, making life into an art. This gives us 
a chance of ‘caring of the self’ for oneself. The sadhus renounce mainstream society, family 
and their all relations with the past and accept new values of the sadhu community in search 
of salvation. In other words, the sadhus free themselves from their political bond with
                                                
15 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: III, p. 239. 
16 Ibid., p 140. 
17 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, p. 19. 
18 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, p. 254. 
19 Nietzsche argues that the act of self-denial in ascetic life is also affirmation.  In order to affirm life, one has 
to deny it, undo it. 
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mainstream politics and society and form an alternative bond with their own sadhu 
community. 
The sadhu community is a break from the mainstream Indian/Nepali society as it is free 
from the social bonds of family and the restrictions of caste imposed on them by the existing 
power relations, giving us a glimpse of an alternative political community. The world of the 
sadhus offers a home for all those who are misfit in the traditional household life including 
widows, orphans, homeless, old, disabled people, neurotics, criminals, and spiritual 
radicals (this amalgam of social milieus constitutes various types of sadhus20. Some of them 
are unexceptional while others are genuine in their pursuit for their spiritual goal). The 
sadhu society recodes or re-inscribes traditional household identity. They all feel a mystic 
oneness in the alternative community even though a very few sadhus still maintain the 
hierarchy of caste in their new communities. Sondra Hausner writes: 
 
A Sadhu in his thirties whom I met in Hardwar had joined an ascetic order as orphan 
child…Because of its insistence on confronting the limits of householder life, Sadhu society 
also certainly includes former criminals, people with mental illness, and runaways–those who 
are not easily accepted back into householder society, and who need an alternative social 
institution.21  
 
The sadhus constitute themselves in a different political register by renouncing the 
mainstream social norms of Indian life. Renouncing his birth family and community for the 
search for God, the sadhu enters into his new community consisting of Brahma as well as 
gurus and fellow sadhus. Such acts of ‘unbecoming’ past societal life and becoming a 
different being forms the very basis of the political in constituting a new being in their 
existence.  
In the following section, we examine three major sects of the sadhus in order to show 
how they self-fashion themselves beyond the domination and control of normative Hindu 
society; how they escape being the object of the political strategy, of a general strategy of 
power; and how this is a nonsovereign formation of the power constituting oneself in what 
one thinks, feels and acts, which shapes what they are. 
 
                                                
20 See J. Copeman and A. Ikegame, The Guru in South Asia: New Interdisciplinary Perspectives (London: 
Routledge, 2012). 
21 Hausner also cites ethnographer Robert Gross saying, “asceticism provides a viable alternate life style for 
individuals living within the rigid hierarchically stratified system of the caste society,” p. 44. 
2016   |   The South Asianist 4 (2): 78-100   |   pg. 86 
 
  Figure 2. 
 
The first major sect of the sadhus, the Vaisnav or Saivav, practice austerity in several 
ways. Some practice breathing, some practice fasting, some practice tapasya (meditation), 
and some inflict pain on themselves. All these practices are intended to deface the social 
inscriptions in the form of dietary systems, breathing systems, and listening systems imposed 
on their bodies, and they transform their bodies into clean and holy entities as with the 
temple. The body is regarded as inherently dirty, and in need of transformation toward a 
clean shrine for the god to dwell in. The austerities are also intended to revitalise body’s 
power, mastery over passivity, docility and impotence: 
 
Tantric masters discovered long ago that success in both the outer world and the spiritual realm 
is possible only if we awaken our latent power, because any meaningful accomplishment, and 
especially the attainment of the ultimate spiritual goal, requires great strength and stamina. The 
key to success is Shakti – the power of soul, the power of the divine force within. Everyone 
possesses an infinite (and indomitable) shakti, but for the post it remains dormant. And those 
whose shakti is largely unawakened have neither the capacity to be successful in the world nor 
the capacity to enjoy worldly pleasures. Without access to our shakti, true spiritual illumination 
is not possible. Awakening and using shakti is the goal of tantra, and this is why tantra sadhana 
is also known as shakti sadhana.22
                                                
22 Tigunait, p. 2.  
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The practices of cleansing the body are complex, and speak of a politics of life or the 
political as a self-formation. All austerities are intended to regulate the habits of the body 
into different modes.23 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault elucidates how the body’s habits 
are normalised to meet the specific needs of power, or how it is made passive. He states, 
for instance, that ‘a body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and 
improved…in every society the body was in the grips of very strict power, which imposed 
on it constraints, prohibitions, or obligations’.24 Certainly the renouncer upon entering into 
the sadhu society has to normalise the body in a way that the society expects, but the unique 
aspect of the sadhu society’s treatment of body is that it does not treat the body as ‘docile’ 
but as a very active site in which all possibilities of salvation can be realised. More 
interestingly, the practices on the body, and decorations, are intended for the realisation of 
salvation. The body is not a sick, governable and normalized passive object but an active 
agent that embodies a new spiritual power. The whole body is regarded as a complex, 
multilayered indivisible synthesis of psychic, somatic, emotional, sensory, cognitive, and 
visionary forces. This is broadly held throughout South Asian societies, and differs in 
important ways from Foucault’s treatment of body in Discipline and Punish and The History 
of Madness. We find, for example, that 
 
one of the central features of Foucault's argument is that changing European conceptions of the 
body made various disciplinary techniques possible and effective as mechanisms of control. 
The docile body-stripped of meaning and regimented according to programs of utility and 
efficiency-became the building block of state power as reflected in such seemingly dissimilar 
and unrelated phenomenon as assembly line choreography, prison architecture, school- room 
etiquette, hospital sanitation, and the collection of census data. In his genealogy of the body, 
Foucault refuses to accept that these and other technologies of control in modern life can be 
explained, or made sense of, with reference to the logic of post-Enlightenment reason or rational 
analysis. Rather they are the product of a history of errors and "contingent conjunctures" that 
must be understood not through a decoding of symbols but in terms of a somatic, materialist 
expose of power.25 
 
By giving a new habit or mode to the body and acting contrary to so-called human 
nature, the sadhus ‘reverse all values’ of a householder society, which regulate the body 
and self and invent what Nietzsche calls ‘second nature’ in them.26 The body is the primary 
object of attention of the sadhus. This type of sadhus (fig. 2) performs various postures, 
                                                
23 For instance, the ethics of listening as a way of cleansing heart described by in his essay echoes Sadhu’s 
own intended goal of listening God’s sermons “For the possessor of such a defective heart, the only solution, 
according to the author, lies in cleansing (tahara) the heart, both by giving up the sinful acts that led to such a 
state and by repeatedly listening, with intention and concentration, to sermons, exhortations, and Quranic 
verse.” Different cultural traditions have such arts of living with the same ulterior motive of cleansing body 
and purifying soul. P.627. The Ethics of Listening: Cassette-Sermon Audition in Contemporary Egypt, Charles 
Hirschkind, American Ethnologist, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Aug., 2001), pp. 623-649. 
24 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 136. 
25 Alter, p. 50. 
26	Friedrich Nietzsche, 1874.	
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known as asanas to cleanse the nerves and stimulate the flow of prana (breathing) and 
master the regulation of body.  All sadhus fast on ekadashi, the eleventh day after every full 
and new moon, when phalahari eat only fruits, dhudharis drink only milk. Some sadhus 
wear ‘chastity belts’, on their loins to keep sexual feelings from distracting them from feeling 
holiness. They also refrain from eating foods such as ginger, garlic or anything that they 
consider might stimulate sexual urges.  Some take a vow of silence for several years. 
 Practicing such forms of austerity, the sadhus can achieve control of their bodies, their 
breathing, their habits, their stimulations, their passions, their malfunctions, their diet, and 
their cosmetics.27 They are self-sovereign over their bodies in all ways, which can be said 
to neutralise power’s efficacy over their bodies. Their practices of bodily power/energy not 
only resist social power or mainstream society’s (in the form of authority, customs and laws) 
attempts to normalise the body, but also shows that one can govern oneself without power’s 
normalization of one’s body.  
The attempt by the dominant mode of power relation ‘to classify and regulate all forms 
of experience through a…frequency of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation’28 falls short 
in the life of the sadhus.29 Foucault realises the existence of such a mode of resistance, which 
escapes power relations, namely: 
 
something in the social body, in classes, groups and individuals themselves which in some 
sense escapes relations of power, something which is by no means a more or less docile or 
reactive primal matter but rather a centrifugal movement, an inverse energy, a discharge.30  
 
The sadhus are the masters of their bodies, and I argue here that the political task is to 
rediscover the power of body. They constitute and control their bodies’ regulation of prana 
(breathing), its blood circulation and the flow of desires. It is not a body constructed by 
dominant power relations but is self-constituted by the sadhus themselves. Social power 
does not succeed in inscribing on the sadhus’ body, such as its sleep patterns,31 diet patterns, 
labour patterns, etc., but these are all self-constituted and ruled by the sadhus themselves. 
Some sadhus develop extraordinary power over their bodies, and manage extraordinary 
feats such as the ability to withstand very cold water for hours in winter, or remain by the 
fire hot summer; or bury themselves in sand for hours; or can walk on broken glass or nails.
                                                
27 These things seem only personal but they are political too.  In a similar case, Richard Rorty misleadingly 
accuses Foucault of turning away from political issues focusing on very personal activities of the self in his 
later writings. Foucault claims that one’s relation to oneself is not just personal activity but also political one. 
“Foucault’s sense of the political has nothing to do with an overtly political project: “I mean that the questions 
I am trying to ask are not determined by a pre-established political outlook and do not tend toward the 
realization of some definite political project.”  The Foucault Reader, p. 375. It is a “politics as ethics” and 
“ethics as an art.”  It is more self-fashioning oneself than being defined by a dominant power relation.  
28 Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. II, p. 25. 
29 By standing on their heads, the Sadhus reverse all the values of householder society. This posture symbolizes 
the “transvaluation” of all values, not through some abstract theory but by a concrete practice. 
30 Foucault, Power and Knowledge, p. 137. 
31 There is a popular saying that when the world is at work, Sadhus are at rest (during the day) and when the 
world is at rest, the Sadhus are at work (during the night). 
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 All these practices, and power over the body, are what the sadhus constitute themselves 
in them: ‘you may be weaker than the whole world but you are always stronger than 
yourself. Let me send my power against my power’.32 The self which exerts its own power 
against itself constitutes a radical sense of political individualism. All the inscriptions that 
society imposes on their bodies in their past lives have been washed out and made pure 
with the enunciation rituals performed when they first enter the new community of sadhana 
(meditation): ‘The new bodies which Sadhus ritually…[constitute] are untainted with the 
social residue of their previous lives and can propel them into states of potential religious 
and cosmic realization.’33   
 
 
  Figure 3. 
 
The Naga Babas (see fig. 3) are the second sect of sadhus in this discussion, and are 
distinguished by their nudity, seen as a pure form of life, and indeed the very truth of life. 
Verrier Elwin (1960) suggests a genealogy for the word naga: 
 
                                                
32 Rose, pp. 68-69. 
33 Hausner, p. 50. 
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The most likely derivation to my mind is that which traces "Naga" from the word Nok or people 
which is its meaning in a few Tibeto-Burman languages, as in Garo, Nokte and Ao. It is common 
throughout India for tribesmen to call themselves by the word “naga” meaning "man" an 
attractive habit which suggests that they look on themselves simply as people free from 
communal or caste association.34 
 
We might theorise that prior to the birth of sovereign power, nudity is seen as holy or 
‘divine madness’, or in the words of Foucault ‘secrete delirium’.35 The two meanings of 
nudity relate, one the one hand, to attraction and power, and on the other, to shame - 
invented with the practice of covering the body, which is ugly, thus reducing the body to 
powerlessness. The first meaning is primitive and the latter historical. We see society 
‘reproducing’ life in other ways at certain historical moments, making nudity unholy or 
shameful. Shame is a political construct that society imposes on the bare ‘pure body’ in the 
name of social ideals. ‘The difficulty of moving beyond shame’, Sara Ahmed writes, ‘is a 
sign of the power of the normative [sovereign power], and the role of loving others in 
enforcing social ideals’.36  
The naked body is deemed shameful when the sovereign feels that it is ‘unreproductive’ 
for its interests; shame is given the sign of madness, and it becomes the ‘pure spectacle’ of 
shame regulated by sovereign power: ‘Madness became pure spectacle, in a world over 
which Sade extended his sovereignty and which was offered as a diversion to the good 
conscience of a reason’.37 Subjects were asked to maintain certain morals, read scriptures, 
behave well, dine well in order to avoid madness. Shame, on the other hand, is used as a 
surveillance of morals in the service of society; to tame the madness of the population. But 
the sadhu revives the idea of their god’s madness as a sign of divinity. Madness is no longer 
a monster inside oneself, nor an animal, but a sign of divinity. We might say that divine 
madness38 in the naga babas is something sovereign power’s ‘technologies of domination’ 
cannot detect as it operates within fields of nonsovereign power. It is the power of the divine 
immanence, which Foucault calls ‘undifferentiated experience, a not yet divided experience 
of division itself’,39 in which an individual constitutes himself/herself in relation to the self 
through the practice of the body. There was, in other words, no shameful madness in 
antiquity.
                                                
34 There are references to militant Naga mendicants in Verrier Elwin’s Nagaland (1960) and E. M. Foster’s 
Passage to India. I am interested only in the etymological meaning of the “naga” for my purpose here and am 
not referring to any of the Tibeto-Burmese speaking peoples, such as those of Nagaland state in India. 
35 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, p 96-97.  
36 Ahmed, p. 7.  
37 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, p. 69-70. 
38 The word “divine’ does not refer to supernatural or spiritual power in my present discussion. It rather refers 
to the “immanence of life,” leading to the idea of parallelism between physical and spiritual exercises. I think 
divine is pushed on the direction of transcendent by the sovereign at some historical time because that is what 
it could not control. The sovereign separates its subjects’ body and its desires or passions and purifies the soul. 
39 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, p. ix. 
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On the contrary, madness was considered holy. The madness of Christ was considered 
as the glory of the humanity and the way Yahweh reveals his plan. It is the power of the 
people to awake to a new truth. Furthermore, Foucault suggests “delirium[madness] is the 
dream of waking persons’.40 There are several myths in the ancient Indian literature in which 
the Lord Shiva would walk naked in his madness across the Himalayas fully intoxicated by 
marijuana. But society at a specific historical time imposed shame on the human body:  “It 
could be said that shame would function as part of the honorific codes that regulate 
sovereign power…”41 The sadhus, on the other hand, have no fear of walking bare bodied. 
When naga babas walk the street without fear or shame, it resists existing social power, 
which imposes shame on the body for its proper political management and control. Some 
see nudity in the sadhu tradition as an absolute renunciation of attachments to the material 
world, a complete control of sexuality and the sensual body.  
However, we suggest here that it is less resistance as a celebration of life,42 without fear 
from ‘rules of the conduct’ imposed by dominant social values. Nudity in a sense renders 
society ineffective. This is the reason we occasionally see people march naked in the public 
squares as a resistance against sovereign power’s unjust moves. Remaining nude or semi-
nude especially in the cold of winter is considered a severe austerity, and an emulation of 
Shiva, who himself would walk in the nude in the cold Himalayas. There are no inscriptions 
of sovereign (society) in their bodies. To show freedom from society’s rules of the conducts, 
such as rules of the sacred, cleanliness and morality of the householder’s life, the naga babas 
walk in nakedness. In her novel, Gita Mehta suggests ‘to demonstrate total freedom from 
‘attachment,’ normative rules of cleanliness (and sometimes of morality) are deliberately 
broken. Thus the profane becomes sacred, the sacred profane’.43 The naga babas, likewise, 
are believed to be capable of placing curses on people. They are thus believed to be 
powerful. Mehta writes that people believe they ‘levitate and…place irrevocable curses on 
any who displeased him.”44 Nagas are also considered warrior ascetics who fought against 
the British Empire. According to Mehta, parents often tell stories of naga ascetics to children, 
‘twenty thousand Naga ascetics, naked and ash-covered with matted locks, had come down 
from their caves in the Himalayas to do battle with the red-coated Englishmen ambitious for 
empire.’45 Naga babas thus remain emblems of power in Hindu society. Their nude bodies 
are understood to oppose prevalent beliefs about nudity as shameful madness or a 
malfunction of the body.  
The Aghori (see fig. 4), the last section of the present discussion, is a sub-sect of Shaivas, 
and are known as the Kapalikas or ‘bearers of skulls’. The word aghori in Sanskrit means 
non-terrifying. Aghoris worship the terrifying manifestation of Shiva, also called 
                                                
40 Foucault, cited in The History of Madness, p. 103 
41 Binkley, Dolan et. al, p. 53-77. 
42 In the Hindu myth, there is a story of the Lord Shiva celebrating sex with his wife Parvati.  
43 Mehta, p. 249. 
44 Ibid., p. 227. 
45 Ibid., p. 229. 
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Bhairavanath and were known to perform human sacrifice,46 which often involved offering 
their own flesh to the deity in ritual acts of self-mutilation. Drinking out of a kapala (skull 
cup) symbolises the sadhu’s ability to take part in the life-force of the deceased, taming it 
with the use of mantras. Carrying a skull also symbolises conquering the duality of life and 
death. This sort of Aghori practice of playing with the terrifying force of death ridicules 
society’s death punishment. 
 
 
 Figure 4. 
 
For an Aghori, death or any cruelty imposed by society is not a threat. He symbolically 
challenges society by playing with death, and it can be considered as a celebration/self-
fashioning of life even in the face of death. Nietzsche suggests that ‘Saying Yes to life even 
in its strangest and hardest problems [like death], the will to life rejoicing over its own 
inexhaustibility even in the very sacrifice of its highest types–that is what I called 
Dionysian’47. Aghoris self-fashion life even in the face of fear and of the cruelty of life.  They 
ridicule the illusion of the flesh and give a form to what an Aghori looks like:  
 
death is harnessed to the cycle of regeneration and converted into birth. One of the key 
ways…by which this restitution of life is dramatised is by the elaborate construction, and 
subsequent negation, of its antithesis – decomposition and decay. An emphasis on biological
                                                
46 The practice of human sacrifice no longer exists among this group of sadhus today. Moreover, these sadhus 
are not many in number in these days. But they still eat flesh of a dead human body. However, I am not 
interested in the cannibalistic implication of this practice here. What interests me with such practice is an 
Aghori,’s capacity to constitute a different form/habit of the body beyond the normalizing effects of normative 
rule (sovereign power) of the Hindu society. 
47 Nietzsche, p. 562-563. 
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processes is used to darken the background against which the ultimate triumph over biology 
(and hence death) can shine forth all the more brightly…The vigil of the Aghori on the 
cremation ground reveals this process clearly, for his morbid revelry in putrescence only serves 
to underline his claim to have transcended the world of biology and pollution, and to have 
conquered death. By wallowing in decay and death the Aghori histrionically proclaims his 
victory over them.48  
 
For the Aghoris ‘bad is good, death is life, dirty is clean’.49  All illusions including the 
concept of death as a terror are recognized as imposed on bodies by society and the only 
way to make society ineffective is to gain power over the elements of creation (including 
the cycle of life and death) by themselves. They drink alcohol, eat meat, and use obscene 
language, transgressions that defy conventional Hindu rules of purity and pollution, and 
thus transcend in the most overt and concrete manner all dualities imposed by sovereign 
power. Creating a different world and transferring oneself through a different tradition and 
living in it with a different nature is a terrifying, monstrous movement.  
But the objective is to free oneself from the bondage of moksha (the cycle of birth and 
rebirth), and to unite with the supreme self (Paramaathma). The concept of moksha 
(liberation) itself resembles the concept of immanence because it is through the practice of 
the body that a sadhu realizes liberation. But society distances moksha, attributing 
transcendence to it in order to make a specific ‘reproduction’ of sick people who do nothing 
but cry for nonexistent transcendence for their liberation so that society can control their 
body and thought.50  The divine or Brahma is not transcendent (everything is Brahma in 
Hinduism), it is also an unacknowledged experience of the body. Shiva, for them, is not an 
otherworldly entity51 but a realization of the immanent power of the body through its 
practice. In other words, there is little point in dismissing sadhus by calling them 
otherworldly.  
There is no death for the Aghoris, as death is life.52 There is no duality between death 
and life. The political ‘reproduction’ imposed by society makes this cycle of birth and rebirth 
its object by introducing the idea of death in the populace. By transcending the duality 
between death and life, Aghoris prevent society from making their lives its political object. 
Their practices are seen by the society as terrifying (drinking water from a skull, and eating 
human flesh, for instance) so they overcome terror by engaging with it routinely. Death as 
a terrifying entity is imposed on life by society to manage and control the population. This 
‘characteristic privilege’ of ‘sovereign power to decide life and death’,53 is greatly 
challenged by the Aghoris’ fearless overcoming of the duality between life and death. The 
                                                
48 Bloch and Parry, p 26-27. 
49 Hausner, p. 37. 
50 The whole idea resonates with Nietzsche’s idea of “slave morality” in his book Genealogy of Morals.  
51 Deleuze says transcendence does not mean other worldly, but it is immanent to body. 
52 There is a popular belief in Hinduism: “Ante mati sa gatih,” which Robert E. Svobodap interprets as 
“Whatever you are thinking about at the moment of death determines your next rebirth.” See Svobodap, p. 
89. 
53 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 136. 
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Aghoris say that there is no death but only life. This is usually understood in terms of a 
popular concept of reincarnation in Hinduism. However, there is a possible political 
interpretation, namely that portraying death as a non-terrifying or loving entity as life, they 
challenge the domination and control of sovereign power. Some may argue that the fear of 
death is innate. We might argue that it is a ‘political reproduction’. The classic example of 
Adam and Eve suggests a lack of consciousness of life and death. It is God (a form of 
sovereign power) that politically reproduces such a concept in them.  
The other thing that the Aghoris resist is the distinction made between good (clean) and 
bad (unclean). The invention of the distinction between the ideas of good and bad has also 
its ideological origin. It is a political construct. The origin of the idea of a distinction between 
good and evil is what Nietzsche has traced to the birth of priesthood in his Genealogy of 
Morals. For the Aghoris, there is no evil, everything emanates from Brahman. According to 
them, anything in this universe is the manifestation of God (God as immanence), so 
everything is as pure as God and is God-like. There is no evil or bad in the world. Society 
(like the priesthood in the case of Nietzsche in Genealogy of Morals) imposed the idea of 
bad or evil on its people at a certain historical time54 in order to control and dominate them. 
The Aghori sadhus believe that every human is a dead body (shava) because human 
pleasures inscribed on the human bodies are political reproductions. They achieve great 
siddhis (powers) through their sadhana (spiritual practices) by overcoming the false desires 
of the manipulated body. So, their primal energy and exceptional power exceed any form 
of sovereign power. Such a formation of exceptional power in one’s body is a nonsovereign 
way of being self-sovereign. So, this is an instance of the nonsovereign model of constituting 
oneself beyond the power of society without challenging its narratives but simply making it 
ineffective to act over the field of one’s body.  This is what can be considered a creation of 
a new subject, inventing a new mode of existence, a new mode of “conative drive,” in other 
words, a new way of being political. 
We turn now to the earlier claim that the death of the past life of the sadhu, as a 
householder, and his new birth as a renouncer, creates the possibility for a politics of self-
fashioning by creating a new way of being a subject or constitution of oneself. The sadhus’ 
renunciation of households, society and material possessions might generally be considered 
escapist. Renouncers of life may be seen as escapists or nihilists because they do not will 
the passion of life. They actually have an ‘aversion’ to the life of the senses. In this paper, 
however, it is argued that renunciation affords a condition for the invention of a new way 
of being a subject; a new way of defining oneself in relation to oneself.  
In many regards this follows Nietzsche’s explanation of nihilism. Here, nihilism is not 
always negative, as ‘it makes negation a power of affirming’ where destruction becomes a 
creative force. The sadhus’ quest for the pure, ultimate and ideal soul, negates everything 
earthly. If the political is understood as self-constitution of individual or group, their quest
                                                
54 I am not explaining how this occurred at a historical time because that is not my purpose in this article. 
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for the pure soul is political, no matter how they regard their salvation. Here, we suggest it 
can have a political implication. It starts up with everything positive, affirmative and joyful 
in their lives. By rejecting the traditional household and following the ways of the sadhu’s 
life, they are able to create their own communities in which they express their creativity of 
self-fashioning. Positive nihilism negates other things in order to create what the nihilist 
wants. For example, a key concept underlying sexual austerity in the sadhus is to transform 
the “inner heat” of the sexual urge into spiritual energy: “virile force and spiritual power, 
the flame of sexuality, which has to be fanned by austerities, feeding the bonfire of mystical 
ecstasy. Shiva is the erotic ascetic. The extreme asceticism constitutes inner power, which 
is compare with firepower. "Fire from his third eye burns up Kama, the cupid god of Love." 
The Sadhus develop various techniques of transformation of sexual energy, kama, into 
spiritual power. In other words, Sadhus transport their lust into spiritual energy55, which 
gives them a new joy of the body; a new way of being a subject otherwise. So, it is not 
giving up desire but transforming it into a more joyous kind. This can be an alternative way 
of fulfilling bodily desire or the force of immanence. It’s a creation of a new form of passion; 
a new political act. It is an act of attention, a quality of a wakening, which produces 
insightfulness and unselfish acts. The Sadhu’s life is  a yes to the eternal recurrence 
(production of the highest form of life) in the sense that it does not let any doctrine rule life 
but creates a new mode of the subject, a new way of being political: ‘We…want to become 
those we are – human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves 
laws, who creates themselves’.56  
The other way of being a new subject and experiencing a new mode of life can be seen 
in the sadhus' break from conventional society. The normative construction of Hindu 
society guides the ‘rules of conduct’ for its individuals. But, the sadhus separate themselves 
from mainstream society, merge with their own renouncers’ community and practice a life 
of spirituality. They even separate themselves from themselves, putting life beyond the 
individual or person, having been liberated from persona or individual or collectives, the 
Sadhus explore ‘a world of impersonal and pre-individual singularities…a free and 
unbounded energy. These are nomadic singularities which are no longer imprisoned within 
the fixed individuality of’ the sovereign57. The sadhus feel richer than the sovereign with the 
few possessions they carry with them. They experience a palatial comfort, a new mode of 
joy, living in their small huts or caves known as kuti in the jungle or around the ancient 
temples.  
Following Burgess, we identify ‘rituals and identifiers employed to sustain such a state 
of separation from the caste system and mainstream society as a whole, such as the 
                                                
55 Spiritual energy is not a realization of transcendence but rather an immanent experience of one’s bodily 
pleasure.   
56 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 266. 
57 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 107. 
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sacramental use of ganja and the growing of long matted locks’,58known as jata, as a sign 
of renunciation. Such separation from the householder society allows the Sadhus the 
pleasure of ‘rejoining oneself as the end and object of a technique of life, an art of living. It 
involves coming together with oneself, the essential moment of which is not the 
objectification of the self in a true discourse, but the subjectivation of true discourse in a 
practice and exercise of oneself on oneself’,59 The subjectivation of power enters when one 
relates with the prevalent form of domination and control. But, the Sadhus relate to 
themselves in terms of defining themselves through the self-constitution of the self and body. 
So, the Sadhu’s life gives us the techniques or practices through which one creates and 
“cares of the self.”60 The sadhu‘s life ‘intensifies the relation to political action rather than 
hindering it…[the] distance between me and the world, hollowed out by care of the self, is 
constitutive of action, but of a regulated, specific and deliberate action. One cares for 
oneself not in order to escape from the world but in order to act properly in it’.61 The 
detachment from the world and oneself creates an emptiness, which allows the care for the 
others. These sadhus are not escapists but they are tragic characters who say a ‘joyous Yes’ 
to the world. Is this not a great art to give a style to life by oneself? Are not these Sadhus, 
who form their own bodies and thoughts, the artists of life? Nietzsche says ‘To “give style” 
to one’s character – a great and rare art!’62 For Nietzsche, life is an art. Breaking from our 
fetishistic attachment to society and symbol systems, the alternative model of micropolitics 
focuses on the ‘direct, non-symbolic awareness of one’s body from the inside’63. There can 
be existence or reality apart from language, discourse and the symbolic order, which rebuts 
Lacan: there is ‘no such thing as a pre-discursive reality’, ‘every reality is founded and 
defined by a discourse’64. This postulate on the nature of reality excludes physical 
sensations, bodily feelings, emotions and fantasies–an entire gamut of human experience 
that occurs before or separate from discourse. 
The world of the sadhus is one of the best examples of how one can constitute a different 
mode of power relation in defining him or herself. The sadhus do not seek macrological 
forms of ideology to transform themselves; they do not seek a collective political 
enunciation; their intentionally and voluntary actions are not subordinated to sovereign 
power. Rather they would give the ‘rules of conduct to themselves’; each group (or member) 
of a sadhus community has kept singular way of changing themselves, of setting ‘the rules 
                                                
58 Vincent E. Burgess, 2007, ‘Indian Influences on Rastafarianism’, unpublished Senior Honors Thesis, Ohio 
State University. Having long hair in the Nineteenth Century Europe would be considered as a rebellion. That’s 
why I am reinforcing the idea that all those activities of the sadhus are not only personal but they are very 
political as well. 
59 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, p. 333. 
60 See Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, Vol. III. 
61 Gros , p. 702.   
62 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 232. 
63 Milner, The Suppressed Madness of Sane Men, p. 263. 
64 Jacques Lacan, p. 32. 
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of conduct’.  The Nietzschean project of ‘Be yourself’ in your mind and body (that includes 
our values as well) is what find is expressed in the lives of these sadhus. A lot of people 
associate sadhus’ rules of conduct with ascetic ideals or nihilist denial of forces of life. But, 
I argue that the Sadhus’ rules of conduct are positive phenomena. I asked a Sadhu “Why do 
you restrain your body, your desire?” And the Sadhu said, “The desire you have is not your 
desire. The true desire of the human being is to seek God. God is what one should desire.”65 
Though I am not interested in seeking God, his remark reminds me of Delueze and Guattari, 
who illustrate in the Anti-Oedipus that what we desire is not our desire. Our desires are 
formed by our interaction with power relations. This explanation helps us better understand 
the ways the Sadhus want to relate themselves to the power relations in a new way by 
constituting their own desires or rules of conduct by themselves without relating to the given 
power relations.  
Foucault’s “What is Enlightenment?” deals with the same question of how to reduce 
power relations while at the same time increasing the capacity to act or desire for oneself. 
It is people’s own endeavour to create their own bodies, desires and thoughts without letting 
them be receptive to exteriority. Enlightenment is the practice of the body and realization 
of how such a practice reduces the grasp of power relations over oneself. So, the sadhus’ 
enlightenment practices ‘…revise the understanding of the self, society, and the universe by 
directing them intentionally toward an alternative mode of existence within the dominant 
environment [power relation]’66. The sadhu’s renunciation of society and its political 
domination and control of life inaugurates a new way of being political by forming new 
subjectivity, different social relations and alternative power formation, transfiguring life, a 
true model of the enlightenment by being true to oneself.  In such an understanding of 
enlightenment as a practice, the ascetic sadhus’ life unfolds a radically different conception 
of political being than what is found in the dominant political worldview, and this 
conception grounds a different type of power relations (nonsovereign relations) from 
sovereign power (social power).  
Let me then further discuss how a different type of power relations works in a 
nonsovereign formation of subjectivity in the sadhus. The sadhus are self-sovereign over 
their lives since they reside outside the field of the laws not disobeying society in a straight 
confrontation as armed rebellions do but making the laws simply ineffective to normalize 
them.67 The laws ban taking marijuana, walking naked in public places, eating dead human 
flesh, and self-immolation. Society controls such activities as illegal. But, the sadhus do all 
that. Marijuana is considered Prasad, a holy food of the Lord Shiva (most supreme God for 
the sadhus as well all for the Hindus), and freely distributed on the day of festival called 
Shivaratri. The naga babas (fig.3) walk naked around the temple, the river and his kuti (hut). 
                                                
65 Based on my personal interview with the Sadhu at Pashupatinath Temple in Kathmandu, Nepal in 2011. 
66 Valantasis, p. 797. 
67  See also Hardt and Negri’s Declaration, especially p. 40. 
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The Aghoris eat dead human flesh and play with ghosts and spirits. These sadhus are above 
the sovereign’s laws in Indian and Nepali society. 
 In the past, political institutions such as the King in Nepal would receive blessings and 
spiritual guidance to rule the country from a particular sect of sadhus called Gorkhnath. 
There is also a myth that when Prince Sidhardha Gautam (later called Lord Buddha) was 
riding through the city in his chariot, he saw, among other types of folk, a renouncer (sadhu) 
walking in the street. He was inspired to become a renouncer and left his society as a prince 
of the Shakyan dynasty. These inspiring sadhus are self-sovereign residing above sovereign 
power (king), which sometimes seeks spiritual cooperation from them to work effectively.   
 The sadhus’ self-sovereign nonsovereignity does not reside within the state of exception 
from the rule, which simply imposes rules outside the rules imposed by him on the 
population. What the sadhus do is to impose rules on themselves.  The nonsovereign power 
that sadhus embody in Indian/Nepali society limits the concept of society in which the 
hidden power of a sovereign itself is suspended before the nonsovereign of the sadhus. For 
example, the sadhus reduce social power to non-power. The law becomes ‘undecidable’ 
and ungraspable and ineffective: ‘…law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign 
privilege’.68  
Working outside the field of society and resisting to the power’s domination through 
the ethics of self-fashioning (Foucault) is the norm for the cultural tradition of the 
nonsovereign sadhus.69 I asked a sadhu in Pashupatinath: ‘How do you relate yourself with 
the state (that’s the simplest term I could use with him to make him understand the meaning 
of a sovereign power) and its laws?’ He responded with, “Nothing! We do not live in a state. 
If we do, we have our own, the kingdom of the sadhus with its own laws of practices.’70 In 
the kingdom of the sadhus, sovereign’s signification turns into nil:  ‘a being in force without 
signification’,71 which cannot command or impose anything. Society neither signifies nor 
controls sadhus’ way of life. What commands nonsovereign power among the sadhus are 
not the laws of sovereignty but the immanence of life-power or capacity of ethics of self-
fashioning one’s own existence or identity by oneself – ‘I constitute myself’.  
In other words, the ways in which the sadhus decorate their bodies, practice sadhana 
(meditation), control their diet, among other practices, constitute what they are. In the life 
of the sadhus, society is valid but impotent to normalise their bodies and thoughts, to classify 
them into class or ideology. The nonsovereign is not a class or category because it does not 
encounter a prevalent ideology of power relations, which I hesitate to think about when I 
define the ‘political’. The nonsovereign subject resists any class/ideology of society which
                                                
68 Deleuze, Foucault, p. 92.  
69 The sadhus can ride for free in public vehicles and can eat fruits from people’s gardens. They do not have 
to produce their identity cards to the border patrol officer when they travel through the border between India 
and Nepal. This extrajudicial political privilege is an instance of constituting a new power relation out of  what 
you  practice in life.  
70 Based on my personal interview with a sadhu at Pashupatinath temple in Kathmandu, Nepal. 
71 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy’, 
http://themessiahandthesovereign.blogspot.com/. 
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takes ‘life as a political object…turn[s] back against the system that was bent on controlling 
it’72. It does not command the ascetic sadhu life. In fact, sadhu asceticism has banned society 
from influencing on its life.  
In conclusion, the model of the ‘political’ constituted by the sadhus’ practices of 
fashioning the self and body and creating ‘a style of existence’ by one’s relation to oneself 
can be a model of life-style politics. Such a concomitant form of politics renders a dominant 
[social] power ineffective to rule over life. Thus, in the nonsovereign mode of the sadhu’s 
life, “life becomes resistance to power when power takes life as its object”73. The 
nonsovereign subject like a sadhu constitutes new power relations in relation to himself 
(Foucault calls it ‘self-fashioning one’s own existence’), marking the radical impossibility of 
domination and control by the coercive institutions of society and the state.   
 
** Special thanks to Thomas L. Kelly for permission to use his photographs (Figures 1, 2 & 
4), and Bennett Stevens for the photograph in Figure 3. 
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